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{the post-existentialist 
neo-stoicism 
of Jason Xenakis 
and the stoic theory 
of suicide
by
Myrto Dragona-Monachou, Ph. D.
«How did he do this? As an 
athlete or a philosopher? As a Man.» 
Epictetus, Discourses, I 2, 26
To determine the rational and the irrational1 and to 
learn to apply these «protoconcepts»2 to specific in­
stances, two things are needed, said Epictetus,3 the 
teacher par excellence of Jason Xenakis: education 
and «the criterion of that which is in keeping with 
one’s own character».4 For, to most men, it is 
reasonable to endure all sorts of humiliation, to 
swallow the worst insults, to undergo any mutilation, 
provided that they remain alive, that they would go on 
living, regardless of whether this existence is of any 
value, or whether existence has become a morally in­
different matter, in the Stoic sense of the word.5 «For 
different men sell themselves (their moral purpose) at 
different prices» Epictetus continues. Most men forget 
their «proper character» and are content to be «a mere 
thread of the garment».6 Whereas others, the few, 
value themselves more highly and prefer to keep their 
character at all costs. For the latter any compromise 
in moral questions is irrational. It is contrary to 
reason and thus contrary to Nature.7 And all familiar 
with Stoicism know how central a notion was reason 
(logos) to the pre-Hegelian Stoic panlogism (not only 
in logic, but also in physics and ethics). Reason (and
—I would like to thank Mr. G. Giannaris for having kindly placed 
at my disposal Xenakis’ early writings and given me information 
about him as a man and teacher. Though familiar with his works 
on Stoicism, I cannot claim to have been personally acquainted 
with him, having met him only once. What follows is entirely 
based on assumptions drawn from his writings and written im­
mediately after his death five years ago.
1. By «rational» or «reasonable» I translate the Greek word 
εύλογον as it occurs in Epictetus and the early Stoics in some par­
ticular cases such as αίρεσις εύλογος and εύλογος εξαγωγή. The 
term may sometimes be translated as «probable» in other cases 
(probabile in Latin) and is very important to Epictetus who speaks 
of a «preconception» of it.
2. For the Greek term πρόληψις which scholars render as 
«preconception», «basic concept» or «anticipation», Xenakis prefers 
the rendering «protoconcept» as shorter and less misleading than 
the other translations. See Epictetus, Philosopher-Therapist, The 
Hague 1969, 59.
3. Discourses 1, 2, 6.
4. Dis. 1, 2, 7: Εις Sé την τού εύλογου καί άλογου κρίσιν ού 
μόνον ταϊς των εκτός άξίαις συγχρώμεθα αλλά καί των κατά τό 
πρόσωπον αυτού ύκαστος. The whole Discourse is concerned with 
«how may a man preserve his proper character upon every oc­
casion».
5. From the moral point of view things are divided by the Stoics 
into good, bad and indifferent. See SVF III 70-71.
6. Dis. 1, 2, 11-18.
7. This is implicit in the Stoic re/os-formula «living in accordan­
ce with nature» which amounts to «living according to reason». Xe­
nakis lays more emphasis on reason than on nature: «Epictetus’ 
precept to live agreeably with nature is reducible to the advice to 
live realistically... or of course reasonably, insofar as the Stoic ap­
peal to nature is regarded as a misguided appeal to human reason» 
(Epictetus 55).
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especially upright reason) was identical with Nature 
and God8 for Stoic Logosphilosophie.9
Among those few who, though holding an 
eudaemonistic view of life in a non-naturalistic sense10 
and being of an optimistic disposition, did not hesitate 
to depart from it of their own free will, as soon as life 
ceased to be worth living, Epictetus mentions an 
Olympian athlete who was in danger of dying unless 
he submitted to an operation.11 He refused the treat­
ment and died, death being preferable to amputation; 
for although his athletic ability would not have been 
lost, he would have felt shame among his fellows, and 
loss of self-esteem. This would also have been incon­
sistent with the teaching of the philosophical school 
of which he was a member. Yet Epictetus, in praising 
him for his decision, remarked that he did not act 
either as an athlete or a philosopher but as a «man».
This comment has been variously interpreted. Bon- 
höffer12 considers this case of suicide as justified by 
the sense of honor which would have been injured if 
the athlete had preferred to go on living mutilated, and 
not by any moral principle. J.M. Rist13 treats this 
«curious» passage, as he puts it, as «a perversion of 
the older and commonplace Stoic view that a man 
may die for his principles», relating it to questions of 
character. Xenakis himself, regarding the act as an ex­
pression of courage, assumes that in praising the 
athlete’s act Epictetus may be condoning euthanasia.14 15
However we interpret this passage, the property of 
man is not here to be separated from that of the 
philosopher, and especially of the Stoic philosopher. 
By «man» Epictetus means, says Xenakis, a rational 
human being, and he adds: «By classifying oneself as a 
human being, one is committed to be a Stoic, that is, 
to regard reason as sovereign». «Man» thus can stand 
for a rational being, and moreover for a free being, 
used to exercising his freedom not in trifling matters 
but in questions of life and death; i.e. for a proud per­
sonality fully aware of his own «proper character». It 
is here a case of dignity and adherence to strict princi­
ples. Epictetus himself said that he would rather die 
than shave his beard off,16 if someone forced him to 
do so, because he considered it «part of his own mask 
as a philosopher»,17 i.e. as a symbol of his philo­
sophical profession, which he deemed to be a ser­
8. SVF I 162; III 337: Ό τής Φύσεως ορθός λόγος δς κυριω- 
τέρα κλήσει προσονομάζεται θεσμός, νόμος θείος ών...
9. Μ. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, Göttingen 1972, 4, v.I, pp. 32-35. Cf. 
Xenakis, Epictetus 54: «Zeus... is preeminently reason... Obeying 
Zeus boils down to obeying logos... Stoicism is literally the deifica­
tion of logos».
10. In spite of the central place of nature in Stoic ethics, this is 
not generally characterized as «naturalistic». G.E. Moore (Principia 
Ethica, London 1903) 110f., considers Stoic ethics «metaphysical» 
and A.A. Long (Hellenistic Philosophy, London 1974, 204) 
regards it as an «epitome of idealism». Xenakis, however, speaks of 
a «confused naturalism» (op. cit., 54).
11. Dis. 1 2, 25-27.
12. Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, Stuttgart 1894, 34.
13. Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, 252.
14. Op. cit. 17.
15. Ibid., 70.
16. Dis. I 2, 29. Cf. Dis. Ill 1 24 and Xenakis, Epictetus 2.
vice imposed by God. Both are cases of the Stoic un­
bending pride and dignity, the only virtues of Stoic 
ethics Christianity could not tolerate. But in no way 
can pride as a justification of suicide be excluded from 
the moral sphere, in which the question of suicide was 
more or less placed by the Stoics.18 It is the combined 
virtues of the athlete and philosopher—whose happy 
coexistence was revived in Xenakis19—that must have 
constructed Epictetus’ notion of «man». And this was 
in harmony with the conception of man in classical 
Greek thought, as embodying the ideal of the unity of 
the «good» and the «beautiful».
In this short paper, dedicated to J. Xenakis’ 
memory, I do not attempt to explain the secret of the 
motivation of his fatal act with Epictetean maxims. 
My reference to Epictetus is not arbitrary, however, 
since Xenakis’ work on the philosopher constitutes the 
main contribution of English-speaking literature to the 
bibliography on Epictetus,20 the prominent defender of 
human freedom. Nor do I justify his decision to desert 
the international society of philosophy. The athlete 
who chose death over amputation and thus gained the 
approval of Epictetus is mentioned here only to ex­
plain Xenakis’ «drastic liberation» in the light of 
Stoicism, the philosophical movement he revived for 
himself by both «living and dying its precepts21» —to 
speak in Heraclitean terms—and to whose study he 
contributed greatly during the last years of his life. I 
attempt to show his last act as the «last item» of Epic­
tetus’ negative ethics which, as viewed by Xenakis, in­
clude «analysis, delay, realism, strength, detachment, 
separation, mediation and suicide».22 Among these 
«remedial devices» suicide is «the most drastic method 
of escaping pain and is used when all else has fail­
ed»,23 an alternative method to self control, a rational 
choice when all other preventive and remedial techni­
ques have proved ineffective, and all resistance 
methods and other «tonics»24 impotent to save one’s
17. See Rist, op. cit., 252.
18. E. Benz (Das Todesproblem in der stoischen Philosophie, 
Stuttgart 1968, 29) cited by Rist (op. cit. 233) regards the problem 
of suicide related to that of free will in Stoicism from the begin­
ning, with which Rist does not agree.
19. As it can be gathered from his curriculum vitae, he was a 
tennis champion for years. And this was rrot his only interest in 
sports.
20. In the preface of his book on Epictetus Xenakis speaks of 
the paucity of Epictetus’ studies. The bibliography by W.A. 
Oldfather (Contribution towards a Bibliography of Epictetus, Ur­
bana 1927-1952), however, amounts to about 1185 titles with tran­
slations and commentaries. Yet it seems true that «this (i.e. Xe­
nakis book) is the first book-length commentary published in 
English devoted only to him» (op. cit. IX).
21. See Heraclitus B 62 DK: ζώντες τον έκείνων θάνατον, τον δε 
έκείνων βίον τεθνεώτες.
22. Epictetus 83. He explains there that the names of these 
items are his own but that they somehow get support from the 
text.
23. Ibid., 23, 84.
24. See ch. 31: «Other safeguards» and 34: «It’s fated and other 
tonics».
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identity, integrity and self-image.25 Xenakis did not 
depart from life out of weakness of will, lack of 
courage, or mental imbalance. No other way out was 
left for him «when the smoke filled the house».26 Far 
from being an irrational outlet in a moment of despair, 
his decision appears to me a «rational» choice, in ac­
cordance with the Stoic teaching and particularly the 
ethics of Epictetus, with which he was familiar and 
which he practiced. Without trying to justify his act 
by any practical standard, considering suicide 
meaningless in matters of life,27 I wish to express my 
conviction, based exclusively on his writings and es­
pecially on those concerned with Stoicism and endors­
ing the «Stoic suicide therapy», and on a paper read at 
the World Congress of Philosophy four years before 
his death, that Xenakis’ «splitting» of his own free will 
must be seen as the most telling confirmation of the 
Stoic (and his own) sense of freedom as «an excluder», 
as liberation28—not as utopianism. Xenakis attained 
the Stoic ideal of the free man. He died «rationally» 
and in accordance with his «idiosyncratic» reading of 
the Stoicism of Epictetus.
His philosophical interest centered upon Stoicism 
relatively late.29 As it can be gathered from references 
in his writings,30 he must have begun his philosophical
25. Ibid., 18: «(Epictetus] approves of suicide or death as a 
device for saving one’s identity; for after all the reason one would 
rather die than lose his integrity or self-image is that such loss 
strikes him as unbearable».
26. The metaphor of «excessive smoke in the house» as a reason 
to depart is very dear to Epictetus: Καπνόν πεποίηκεν έν τώ 
οίκήματι; άν μέτρων μενώ- άν λίαν πολύν, έξέρχομαι. Τούτου γάρ 
μεμνήσθαι καί κρατεΓν, δτι ή θύρα ήνοικται. (Dis. I 25, 18). Cf.I, 
25, 20 and IV 10, 27: εϊ ούτως τάλας είμί, λιμήν το άποθανεϊν. 
Ούτος δ’ έστίν ό λιμήν πάντων, ό θάνατος, αΰτη ή καταφυγή. Διά τούτο 
ούδέν τών έν τώ βίω χαλεπόν έστιν». Τ)ταν θέλης, έξήλθες καί οϋ κα- 
πνίζη. The metaphor was also used with the same connotation by Mar­
cus Aurelius (Med. 5, 29. 8, 47.10, 8).
27. This must be understood in terms of Epicurus’ saying: Ό 
θάνατος ούδέν προς ήμάς (D.L.X 139), further explained in X 
125: to φρικωδέστατον ούν τών κακών ό θάνατος ούδέν προς ήμάς, 
έπειδήπερ δταν μέν ήμεϊς ώμεν, ό θάνατος ού πάρεστιν■ δταν δ’ ό 
θάνατος παρή, τόθ' ήμεϊς ούκ έσμέν. Though not philosophically 
opposed to the right of practicing suicide in extreme cases, i.e. 
when one is actually a burden to himself and to others or in ques­
tions of honor, I think one should consider the matter as a social 
rather than as an individual being. Suicide as self-sacrifice should 
not be put under the same denominator, but only insofar as both 
are expressions of freedom.
28. On Xenakis’ negative freedom as «an excluder» as liberation, 
in contrast to the existential (Sartrian) freedom as responsibility 
and in conformity with the Epictetean view of it as the state of be­
ing «unhindered, unconstrained, unfrustrated, unobsessed, unneu­
rotic» etc., see Epictetus, 15f, 87f. 122f. and passim as well as his 
essays, «Freedom and the Tourist Philospher», «Hippies and 
Cynics» and «Free Will, a Negative Concept».
29. 1968 is the date of his important essay on Stoicism «Logical 
Topics in Epictetus» in South Journ. of Phil. 94-102. There follow 
Epictetus, The Philosopher-Therapist in 1969 and «Stoic Suicide 
Therapy» in Sophia (1972). Relatively late are also the essays 
«Hippies and Cynics» in 1972 and «Noncommittal Philosophy» in 
the same year concerned with Scepticism, Pyrrhonism in par­
ticular. Of the same spirit is the paper «Freedom and the Tourist 
Philosopher» inspired particularly by Epictetus and read at the XV 
World Congress of Philosphy in Bulgaria in 1973.
30. From his article «On the Theological Interpretation of
researches with Plato, to whom he repeatedly retur­
ned.31 He gained philosophical maturity within the 
realm of the logical discipline of analytical philosophy, 
to which he made a considerable contribution with 
several short articles (of a destructively critical 
character) dealing with current moral, aesthetic and 
epistemological theories.32 He considered himself a 
follower of the «ordinary language philosophy».33 In 
his classes he taught almost all branches of ancient 
and modern philosophy with an emphasis on 
aesthetics, logic and linguistic philosophy.34 At the 
same time he deeply admired Cynicism. This was «the 
most durable philosphical movement» for him.35
He greatly extolled the Cynical way of life as exem­
plified and revived by contemporary hippies. So much 
did the Cynic ideal appeal to him that he upheld that 
«the best ethics today happens among hippies (and 
relatives) rather than in philosophy departments».36 
Ancient Scepticism with its noncommittal attitudes 
also attracted him,37 because of his anti-dogmatism 
and his avoidance of anything that could turn his self- 
dependence into ego-dependence.38 Cyrenaic pessimism 
about the attainability of happiness and the Hegesian 
prompt resort to suicide also attracted him at times.39
Plato’s Ethics» (HThR 50, 1957, 67-70) one may assume that his 
Ph. D. Dissertation at Harvard University was on Plato. He méri­
tions there as his «teachers» W. Jaeger, R. Demos, Cavarnos, 
Stampolis, J.L. Cook, D. Ross and other distinguished scholars.
31. The following articles of his are contributions to the Platonic 
studies: «Plato on Ethical Disagreement», Phronesis I (1955) 50-7, 
«Plato Watching a Farce», South. Phil. 4 (1955) 8-12, «Plato on 
Statement and Truth-Value», Mind (1957) 165-172, «Essence, Be­
ing and Fact in Plato», Kantstudien 49( 1957) 167-181, «Plato’s 
Theory of Forms», Classica et Medievalia 19 (1958) 1-6 and 
«Plato’s ‘Sophist’», Phronesis 43(1959) 29-43. He also wrote two ar­
ticles with the same title on Aristotle: «Aristotle on Truth-Value» in 
1957/58.
32. I only mention some titles without detailed particulars: «Or­
dinary Language and Ordinary Belief» 1954, «Meaning» 1954, 
«The Logic of Proper Names» 1955, «Function and Meaning of 
Names», «Sentence and Statement», «Logic and Fiction» 1956, «A 
Mistaken Distinction in Ethical Theory», «Using Expressions» 
1957, «God=Worshipped», «A Logical Consideration of Theism», 
«Deity-Value», «Logical Concepts and Psychology» 1958, «Sens du 
mofdoit’ dans les Principia de Moore», «Ordinary Language 
Philosophy», «Art as Entertainment», «Art, Fiction and Beauty» 
(1959), «Subjects, Falsity, Commitment» (1963) and «Desuper- 
nalization» (1964).
33. Apart from relevant articles, there is an explicit statement of 
his in his article «Deity-Value», Hilbert II 56 (1958) 255-61.
34. This is assumed from his Curriculum Vitae. He has taught 
at Deree College (full professor); University of Alberta (Canada); 
Louisiana State University; McNeese State College; University of 
North Carolina; University of Maryland (Athens Campus).
35. See «Hippies and Cynics» Inquiry (1973) 1-15, also tran­
slated into Greek in the «Panderma Library», 1976, hence ab­
breviated into HC.
36. HC, 2f. Cf. Epictetus 14f, 119f.
37. See «Me» Dialogist, III n.2.Cf. «Stoic Suicide Therapy» 
(SSTn) Sophia 1972, 1 and «Non-Committal Philosophy», 1972.
38. See «Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher», Proceedings XV 
World-Congress, Sofia 1973, v. 4, 145-147. Self-dependence is the 
ideal of Stoic, Cynic and Sceptic philosophy.
39. He did not write anything on the subject but Hegesias is 
referred to in his Epictetus 19 and his articles on Hellenistic 
movements. In SSTh he has put Hegesias’ alleged saying «Suicide 
is liberation» as motto.
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These interests were steps for Xenakis in his ex­
istential quest. Stoicism, particularly the Stoicism of 
Epictetus, almost totally absorbed his last philo­
sophical investigations. Apart from some epistemological 
articles40 most of his publications since 1968 were direct­
ly or indirectly imbued by Stoicism. It is highly probable 
that Xenakis resorted to Epictetus’ «clinic» and surren­
dered himself to his drastic therapy after a personal ex­
perience which probably shocked him deeply.
Plato required that the attendants of philosophy at­
tain a certain age. Physical and mental maturity is 
needed to grasp the meaning of the Stoic teaching. 
«Epictetus’ students were not children... Going to 
school means being sick. If one is not in pain while 
there, he is wasting his time», Xenakis remarks.41 
Epictetus’ means of therapy were too drastic for or­
dinary students, but Xenakis followed the course 
thoroughly. We see what these preventive techniques 
and remedial devices amounted to not only from Xe­
nakis’ «impressionistic» survey in his book on the 
philosopher,42 but also from his essay on «Stoic 
Suicide Therapy». In this paper he mainly epitomizes 
the «credo» of his teacher concerning life and death 
(particularly self-inflicted death) as the ultimate expres­
sion of the most utopian freedom.
The views found in it are so close to his own (as 
revealed in the paper read at Varna in 1973) that there 
is not doubt either that Xenakis fully incorporated the 
Stoic teaching as he understood it, or that he devoted 
himself to Stoicism because he idiosyncratically shared 
the same views. Among his own ideas of life and 
freedom and «life in freedom» Xenakis echoes Epic­
tetus’ teaching on the self and its detachment from ex­
ternals. Not all these presumably Epictetean ideas en­
tirely coincide with those found in accounts of other 
scholars.43 This does not mean that Xenakis biased the 
evidence, but that he read it in a personal way, which 
renders «his Epictetus» somewhat different from the 
one found in most orthodox interpretations.44 It is true 
that Epictetus’ views on suicide are in conformity with
40. «Talking Entailment» «Truth - Functional Perturbations» 
(1969), «Natural Deduction Puzzle» (1975).
41. Epictetus 6. Cf. p. 74 and Dis. II 19, 29 and III 23, 30-32: 
«Men, the lecture-room of the philosopher is a hospital; you ought 
not to walk out of it in pleasure, but in pain. For you are not well 
when you come». Cf. SSTh 83.
42. See Epictetus 83.
43. Most scholars lay more emphasis on Epictetus’ religious 
thought and spirituality. They also relate his passion for freedom 
to his having been born a slave, emancipated later by his master, 
which Xenakis does not see so important for his passion for 
freedom, since «he seldom uses the word in the political sense». 
The meaning of E’.s freedom is for him rather psychological (op. 
cit., 16). His bibliography is greatly selective and consistent with 
the spirit of his own interpretation of Epictetus. This is also at 
variance with my appreciation of Epictetus’ theological ideas found 
in a long chapter devoted to him in my book, The Stoic Argu­
ments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods, Athens 
1976, 209-230, but I do not disagree with his basic assumptions, 
since he has looked at Epictetus from another angle.
44. For bibliography related to my point of view see my book,
op. cit., p. 300.
the general Stoic tradition, though the issue is connect­
ed by him with the question of freedom. Epictetus’ 
treatment of the subject appeared to Xenakis more im­
portant than the traditional Stoic discussions, because 
the lame freedman confronts it existentially and 
associates it with outlooks on life which have greatly 
impressed Xenakis, and which made suicide «in­
evitable». Yet Xenakis lays stress on the Stoic 
features—though with some Cynic shades—of Epic­
tetus’ theory and does not consider him to be at 
variance with orthodox Stoic teaching on this point.
In his haste to depart from life, however, Xenakis 
went beyond Epictetus and the other Stoics. In his 
striving after freedom he chose the most drastic of 
Epictetus’ remedial devices, without heeding his mas­
ter’s advice to «delay when misfortune strikes».45 
Whereas Cleanthes and Epictetus’ pupil Demonax are 
said to have died of their own free will after having 
lived almost a century, and Zeno and Antipater in old age 
—Seneca’s suicide being imposed on him—Xenakis left 
in his early 50’s, at about the age of Cato, the Stoic 
«martyr».46 Despite the features our epoch shares with 
the Hellenistic era, it is more difficult to be a commit­
ted Stoic nowadays than in the distant past. The pit- 
falls in the way of freedom may be too numerous to 
overcome. Xenakis’ obsession with Stoic suicide as 
therapy and ultimate expression of freedom, and his 
sharing Epictetus’ general outlook on life suggests that 
his action be understood in terms of the Stoic «rational 
exit».
Although other Greek philosophers have not openly 
condemned suicide,47 and the Cyrenaic Hegesias ex­
tolled it, the Stoics were the only ones to defend it on 
philosophical grounds as a rational deliverance and ul­
timate affirmation of freedom. The early Stoics 
moreover, Chrysippus in particular, claimed that it is 
the wise man and not the foolish who is entitled to ex­
tract himself from life rationally. Although this ap­
pears paradoxical at first sight, only the wise man’s 
decision is ipso facto rational. Only he can judge 
whether his decision to depart, even if he is happy and
45. See Epictetus 83, 85 and Epictetus’ Manual 20.
46. On Zeno’s death see SVF I 6, on Cleanthes’ I 474-476, and 
on Antipater’s III Ant. 7. Cato died at about his fifties.
47. For Xenakis’ survey on the attitudes of Greek and some 
modern philosophers on suicide (somewhat incomplete) see SSTh. 
The following may be briefly added: The Pythagoreans condemned 
suicide on strict religious grounds and Aristotle on religious and 
social. So did the Epicureans, but because they considered life 
worth living, since death meant absolute dissolution to them. 
Against suicide were also the Academics, Peripatetics and perhaps 
the Cyrenaics except Hegesias. Plato’s stand is more ambivalent 
than as presented by Xenakis. Because he permitted it under ex­
treme necessity. All other Greek philosophers and particularly the 
Stoics, Cynics and perhaps the Sceptics were favourable to it. The 
laws of ancient cities except Keos were repugnant to it. Suicide 
was practiced widely under the Roman Empire, mainly due to 
Stoic influence. Most modern thinkers, particularly John Donne, 
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume and many contemporaries, were not 
opposed to the exercise of the right of suicide. Among those who 
rejected it Schopenhauer is curiously the most prominent. The 
question is revived nowadays because of the discussions held on 
euthanasia.
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virtuous, is correct.48 The late Stoics extended this 
right to all men and Xenakis does not discriminate 
between the wise and the foolish, associating voluntary 
death with the question of freedom, on which the early 
Stoics did not lay particular emphasis.
He finds that most Greek philosophers (including 
Democritus and Socrates) have a positive attitude to 
suicide, considering the «negative» stand of Plato and 
Aristotle «atypical».49 Like the late Stoics, he does not 
determine the particular cases in which suicide is per­
mitted and justified.50 In this he seems to have adopted 
the common late Stoic trend without the technicalities 
concerning the wise and the foolish, since later this 
distinction became weaker. The early Stoics must have 
related this distinction to the question of suicide under 
the influence especially of the Cyrenaics (better the 
adherents of Hegesias), parting company with the 
Cynics in this respect. As we know from Diogenes 
Laertius (II 95) the Hegesians held that it was more 
expedient for the foolish to go on living than to die, 
whereas for the wise, life was a matter of indifference. 
The Cynics, on the other hand, considered suicide the 
best alternative to an irrational course of life. This was 
consistent with their doctrine that death is totally indif­
ferent to man, virtue being his end and freedom his ul­
timate good. As J.M. Rist51 puts it, by their precept 
«either reason or the rope» the Cynics «are prepared to 
prescribe suicide, as a remedy for any kind of failure 
to live a rational life». And though permitting suicide 
even for trivial reasons and according to the moral 
character of the agent, the Cynics did not consider 
that it was the prerogative of the wise man to decide 
upon the rationality of the action, nor did they attach 
great importance to the matter. Xenakis did not lay 
emphasis on this differentiation between the Cynic and 
Stoic views, and, while finding acceptance of suicide 
consistent even with Scepticism, he regards the Stoics 
as pupils of the Cynics, even in his view of suicide as 
a fulfillment of the Cynico-Stoic sense of freedom as 
liberation from hindrance and constraint.
The justification of suicide—though not its extolla- 
tion in Hegesias’ way—constitutes at first sight one of 
the great paradoxes of Stoicism, apparently its most 
irreconcilable antinomy. Its acceptance seems inconsis­
tent with some of the basic tenets of Stoic ethics such 
as the following: The primary inclination of a human 
being is its self-preservation. The end of life is hap­
48. See SVF III 758-759.
49. «SSTh» 79. It is true that Socrates’ death was early consid­
ered a heroic suicide and Cato died reading Plato’s Phaedo.
50. The main circumstances under which suicide was permitted 
by the early Stoics were the following: For the sake of one’s coun­
try and friends and under hard pain, amputation and incurable dis­
ease (SVF III 757). Cf. SVF III 768, where the five ways of 
«rational deliverance» are presented in a metaphorical language: 
Life is like a banquet and there are so many ways of reasonable 
voluntary death as there are reasons for interrupting the banquet; 
namely, great necessity (joyful sometimes), sudden presence of 
obscene talkers, unwholesome food, lack of food, and drunkenness 
with all their metaphysical and actual consequences.
51. Op. cit. p. 237. Cf. pp. 238-239 and D.L. VI 24;86.
piness, and living happily amounts to living in virtue 
and in accordance with nature and logos. But this is 
not the proper place to present or even summarize the 
basic Stoic ethical doctrine with its technicalities and 
its complicated theoretical basis.52 It suffices to say 
that suicide is not required by such doctrines which 
believe that virtue consists of the exercise of reason, 
and it is unalienable by anything under the most ad­
verse circumstances. Strictly speaking, natural evil, in­
cluding pain, is either nonexistent or neceassary for 
the exercise of virtue. This is basic tenet of Stoic 
theodicy (or cacodicy, as Xenakis preferred to call 
it).5·1 Only vice is really bad, and only virtue morally 
good. And vice does not depend on externals, since no 
adversity can change the good disposition of the moral 
agent. Nothing can harm the wise man, because 
nothing can abate the strength of his soul (his tonos). 
Freedom is mainly internal, and this consists of 
assenting to events happening within the deterministic 
nexus of Stoic physics, and of not being compelled to 
follow them. On the higher level of Stoic ethics, people 
are either wise or foolish. But in actual fact the Stoic 
sage was never found. The extreme application of the 
basic Stoic aphorism «bear and forbear» renders all ex­
ternal adversities meaningless, and the fundamentally 
Stoic dispositions of unperturbedness54 (ataraxia) and 
unfazedness (apatheia) make the Stoic invulnerable to 
disturbance and pressure. On the other hand, his con­
tinuous training to eradicate or at least to alleviate 
passion makes the Stoic master of his emotions and 
thus independent of all circumstances. Suicide, 
therefore, should have found no place within the realm 
of appropriate and inappropriate acts.55 It seems 
superfluous in Stoic ethics, which is not so much an 
ethics of «resignation» but of joyful subjection to the 
universal Law of Nature, which is a better arbitrator 
than individual laws and wills.
It is not strange, therefore, that most of our eviden­
ce about the early Stoic theory of suicide has come 
down to us from opponents of Stoicism such as 
Plutarch {«l’adversaire privilégié» of the Stoics)56 and 
the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of 
Aphrodisias. Plutarch criticizes the Stoic views 
destructively in his treatises De stoicorum repugnantiis 
and De communibus notitiis on the ground that they
52. For an excellent modern survey of Stoic ethics see A.A. 
Long, op. cit., 179-209. For a good placement of the question of 
suicide in the realm of the Stoic discussions of duties see 
Bonhöffer, op. cit., 188-193.
53. Epictetus 46ff. He says: «I coined the expressions cacodicy 
(justification of evil) and algodicy (justification of suffering and 
pain) because «theodicy», the usual word employed in connection 
with the problem of evil is absurd if «god» is at the same time 
defined as perfect or even as good». Anyway Xenakis does not 
find the Stoic, even Epictetus’, «cacodicy» entirely satisfactory.
54. These are Xenakis’ renderings for the Greek terms. His in­
terpretation of these Stoic virtues is very much in accordance with 
the Stoic spirit. See Epictetus 81.
55. But as a matter of fact the whole question is placed in this 
realm. See SVF III 763 and Bonhöffer op. cit., 188.
56. Plutarch has been so characterized by D. Babut, Plutarque 
et les Stoïciens, Paris 1971.
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discuss the appropriateness to stay in life or depart 
from it not in terms of what is morally good or bad, 
but in relation to the class of «intermediate» things in 
reference to nature.57 He finds fault with Chrysippus’ 
insistence on the wise man’s duty to depart from life 
(for all his happiness and security) and the fool’s to re­
main alive, even if there is no hope for the latter to ac­
quire wisdom, as well as his view that moral virtue 
and vice have nothing to do with life itself.58 Alexan­
der of Aphrodisias sees a contradiction in the sage’s 
decision to die of his own free will and the Stoic doc­
trine of the self-sufficiency of virtue and its un­
alienability by any lack of natural disadvantages.59 
Cicero, as a Platonist, may be included among them 
since the Platonic attitude to suicide is different. Ac­
cording to it man as a possession of God does not 
have the right to escape except by a divine signal, or 
under extreme necessity, a stand, however, which the 
early Stoics also adopted60 and Epictetus regards as 
the morally justifiable sort of suicide par excellence.61 
Yet Cicero is impartial and in his sole piece of eviden­
ce on the matter he gives us the best Stoic explanation 
why it is appropriate for the sage to depart from life 
even when his virtue is not threatened and he is still 
happy and serene.62 He relates the subject with the 
whole question of «duties» and the subclass of the 
second-level goods, i.e., those which are said to be «in 
accordance with nature» but not strictly within the 
moral sphere, though the wise man’s act to leave life is 
ipso facto a moral choice, provided that his act is 
«timely» behavior.63 Because «many of the things 
which accord with human nature are not uncon­
ditionally appropriate», and thus «suicide is an extreme 
example of conduct inimical to a man’s own interests 
in most circumstances which might be rationally 
defended in certain situations».64
In less technical terms, the Stoic theory of suicide 
may be explained (though not completely justified) on 
the grounds of the evaluation of life and death in 
themselves within the general Stoic theory of value, 
which the opponents of Stoicism could not always 
grasp. Both taken in themselves were considered by 
the Stoics as morally indifferent. As Xenakis remarks, 
«it is the use made of life, not life as such that mat­
ters».65 What is important in questions of life and death
57. See SVF III 759-760: It is the case of the μέσα κατά φύσιν, 
which are neither morally good nor wrong.
58. De comm. not. cp. II p. 1063d (SVF III 759). Cf. SVF III 
761-762.
59. SVF III 764; 766-767.
60. Zeno’s suicide was explained as obeyance to a sign given by 
god. See Rist, op. cit., 234-236 and 242 on Zeno’s death.
61. See Rist, op. cit., 252; Bonhöffer, op. cit., 30. But Xenakis, 
Epictetus 19, considers Zeus’ permission a «mere formality». Cf. 
Dis. I 9 16; III 13, 14.
62. De finibus III 18, 60 (SVF III 763).
63. «Et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit 
beatissimus, si id opportune facere possit. Sic enim censent, oppor- 
tunitatis esse beate vivere, quod est convenienter naturae vivere» 
(SVF III 763).
64. A.A. Long, op. cit., 206.
65. Epictetus 19. Actually this is the view of Epictetus, Dis. II
6, If.
is the moral disposition, intention and character of 
the agent (his προαίρεσις), his moral purpose of inner 
self, to speak in the language of Epictetus. The inner 
motive is quite different in the wise and in the ordinary 
man (or the fool in the early Stoic sense) and this ex­
plains the justification of the decision and the act of 
the former but not of the latter.
As long as externa) circumstances do not threaten 
the human moral purpose and as long as life is consist­
ent with reason, though indifferent in itself, it is still 
preferable to death. It has value, is naturally advan­
tageous and is to be selected and preferred to its op­
posite. Thus it is appropriate for man to enjoy it. But 
when life ceases to be «natural» and even before it 
becomes «unnatural», it turns out to be an άπο- 
προηγμένον, deprived of any intrinsic value; and to 
depart from it is not merely appropriate, a καθήκον, 
but a «perfectly appropriate act» a real κατόρθωμα. 
When man is brought to the point to groan within 
himself, death is no longer a matter of indifference; it 
is to be actively preferred to life. As soon as vice 
threatens one’s moral purpose, one may escape, «not 
so much forced by external circumstances, but by 
moral virtue itself». Because of the «indifference» of life 
and death in themselves, freedom, dignity, pride and 
character, which are indisputable values, are placed on 
a higher level than simple life and longevity.
The right to judge the appropriateness of the last 
action is further extended by the late Stoics to or­
dinary men, and is no longer the prerogative of the 
wise man, «who was rarer than the mythological 
phoenix».66 Some criterion is still necessary, however, 
in order to determine whether circumstances impose 
voluntary departure and at the same time to justify the 
rationality of the action. Wisdom constituted such a 
criterion for the early Stoics but it is generally con­
sidered insufficient. Its formality and vagueness is 
regarded as the weakest point of the Stoic theory of 
suicide, because it may be offered as an excuse for un­
justifiable deaths. In discussing intolerable pain as an 
excuse for suicide, Rist soundly asks: «Does not the 
possibility of committing suicide because of pain make 
it likely that many men, i.e. not only the wise but even 
the foolish, would feel justified in killing themselves on 
occasion when the wise would think it right to 
survive?»67 This ambiguity of the criterion as far as 
the degree of adversity that would impel one to suicide 
is concerned, made Bonhöffer68 condemn the Stoic 
suicide theory as failing to unequivocally determine the 
point to which external necessity is unbearable, even if 
it was stated that it is only under the most difficult cir­
cumstances that the right to depart willingly might be 
granted.
For all these deficiencies and objections pointed out 
even by ancient critics and philosophical rivals of
66. The wise man was an ideal rather than an actual man. See 
SVF III 662;668. From the Middle Stoa onwards it was spoken of 
men «progressing towards virtue» and not so much of the polar 
distinction between the wise and the fools.
67. Op. cit., 239.
68. Op. cit., 192-193.
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Stoicism, the early Stoics elaborated a positive theory 
of suicide, consistent with the greater part of their 
ethical teaching, and most of them put the theory into 
practice themselves. This positive attidude the late 
Stoics defended more fervently, due to the greater in­
stability and anxiety of the Roman age. And even if 
we are not in the position to speak of a general theory 
of suicide held unalterably by all Stoics, i.e. by Zeno 
down to Marcus Aurelius, nevertheless we can trace 
some common trends during the five centuries of 
Stoicism. Without placing suicide at the center of early 
Stoic ethics, there are, some common features that 
testify to the unity of Stoic philosophical thought and 
its hellenic character; for the Jews condemned suicide 
on religious grounds. The matter is closely associated 
with freedom in late Stoicism as the expression and 
fulfillment of its most utopian form. But there is still 
differentiation among its representatives. Seneca extolls 
suicide as the unalienable right of self-disposal. He 
sings «paeans» to it and a certain libido moriendi is 
not alien to him. For him suicide is open to everyone, 
and. as Rist69 puts it, «suicide itself makes a man 
free». He considers it «the ultimate means of salvation» 
and proclaims that «the highway to liberty is any vein 
in one's body».70 He was, moreover, the single late 
Stoic who committed suicide (though forced by Nero, 
with the choice only of its means). M. Aurelius is also 
well disposed to suicide, but his attitude is ambivalent. 
He views the problem existentially. His «crisis of iden­
tity».71 the strong sense of the Heraclitean flux 
dominating everything and making it unimportant 
betray a more emotional attitude on his part than the 
other Stoics'.
In spite of the shades of opinion held by the in­
dividual Stoics, because of their common positive at­
titude towards suicide, we may speak of life in the 
Stoic sense as a «being towards death» in an anti- 
Heideggerian spirit, i.e. not as a matter of ultimate 
concern, but as a matter of «indifference» always pre­
sent in the Stoic's mind as a safety valve to liberation.
Xenakis, unlike Rist72 and Bonhöffer,73 has read an
69. Op. cil-, 248. For a brief survey of Seneca’s views see pp. 
246-250. For references see A.L. Motto, Seneca Source-Book·. 
Guide to the Thought of L.A. Seneca (Amsterdam 1970) p. 207. 
Suicide is regarded by him as the best thing eternal law ever 
ordained, as a pathway to freedom, and every man’s right. The cir­
cumstances under which it is justified amount to those described 
by the early Stoics and he considers some cases when it is un­
justifiable. Ep. 17 is a good evidence for his defense of it. Cf. De 
ira 3.15.4.
70. See Rist. op. cit., 249.
71. The expression belongs to Dodds, cited by Rist, op. cit., 
286. Cf. Med. 10,32; 11,3; 10,8; 8,47 etc.
72. Op. cit., 250-252. Rist sees «the pendulum swung back» with 
him. considering Epictetus’ views more traditional than Seneca’s 
and less favorable to unconditioned suicide. But perhaps Rist has 
overtoned Seneca’s «libido moriendi».
73. Op. cit. 29-39. He classifies E.’s views in three classes:
moral, immoral and what could be called «amoral». Among the
first are those implying a divine sign and to the third belong in­
stances of pride and honor. These three classes are further (pp. 38-
39) divided into seven. Anyway, Epictetus’ more important referen-
unequivocal affirmation of suicide into Epictetus. He 
does not consider rational and moral only the cases in 
which a divine signal is implied. Such cases he finds 
unimportant and mere reminders of the Platonic in­
heritance because he believes God to be only a value 
ideal and a «systematically elusive concept» in him.74 
Though discussing Epictetus’ views of divine providen­
ce and the signs of design in the world, he finds his 
arguments inconclusive and regards Zeus as in­
operative in Epictetus’ world-view, being thus at 
variance with the current orthodox interpretation. Xe­
nakis belittles the importance of passages in which 
Epictetus appears to attempt to dissuade people from 
suicide,75 paying particular attention to passages in 
which suicide is appreciated in terms of freedom, 
dignity and pride. As it is clear in his article on «Stoic 
Suicide Therapy» he deems Epictetus as the main 
representative of the positive Stoic stand on suicide, a 
role that Seneca was more entitled to play. For all his 
scholarly objectivity and his reliable, though somewhat 
«impressionistic», interpretation of Epictetus, he 
sometimes projects his own ideas into him. Not only 
has he presented Epictetus as an «apostle»76 * of 
freedom, in his own sense of it as liberation, but also a 
most fervent defender of suicide.
Epictetus’ enthusiasm for freedom, attested by the 
extensive use of the word in Arrian’s report of the Dis­
courses,11 as well as his anti-existentialist notion of it, 
may have been the main reason why he had so strong 
an appeal to Xenakis as to have him attribute ideas to 
the philosopher more radical than he in fact had. As 
far as we know only Xenakis denied the theonomic 
character of Epictetus’ ethics, arguing that his ethics 
can stand without the belief in God and placing little 
weight on his theological conception of the universe.78 
But apart from their common obsession with freedom 
Xenakis had further reasons for singling out Epictetus 
and becoming a devoted student of his. Epictetus 
much more than the other late Stoics, who were most­
ly ethically minded, still had interest in logical theory. 
And Xenakis was perfectly equipped to tackle the 
technical Stoic logic. Epictetus was also the only 
professional teacher among his nearly contemporary 
Stoics, following the example of his teacher Musonius. 
Xenakis found in him a teacher, like himself, occupied 
with philosophy as a therapy, considering the phi-
ces to suicide on which an objective account could be based are 
the following: Dis. I 2,3:9.J1; 9, 16; 9, 20; 24, 20; 25, 18; Il 1, 
20; 15, 4-8; 23, 16; III 8, 6; 13, 14; 22, 34; 24, 105; IV I, 20; 
171; 10, 27.
74. Epictetus 19, 56. Cf. SSTh 74-76.
75. Dis. I 9 16; II 15, 4-8.
76. See C. Despotopoulos, «Introduction to the translation of a 
selection of Epictetus’ Manual», 'Εποχές I (May, 1963): 85-90.
77. «I know no man upon whose lips the idea (of freedom) more 
frequently occurs. The word «free» (adjective and verb) and 
«freedom» appear some 130 times in Epictetus, that is, with a 
relative frequency about six times that of their occurrence in the 
New Testament and twice that of their occurrence in Marcus 
Aurelius» (W. A. Oldfather, Epictetus, The Discourses, London 
1961, XVII). Cf. Xenakis, Epictetus 16.
78. Epictetus 13, 46, 56, 58.
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losophical school as a clinic and himself as a 
philosopher-therapist with a drastic course of healing.79 
Both paid greater attention to negative than to 
«straight» ethics, coping with fighting pain, which they 
saw as a continuous threat to life, either by preventing 
its appearance, or by alleviating it, or by escaping 
from it through a drastic therapeutic device. He 
believed Epictetus’ methods of therapy, such as «ex­
istential therapy» and «logotherapy», greatly effective in 
modern psychological and psychiatric techniques,80 81
and his negative «analytical»87 ethics more timely than 
many modern normative and meta-ethical theories. He 
found or thought he found in him views on life which 
rendered suicide inevitable. For if there is no escape 
and life is a prison, no eudaemonistic outlook or op­
timistic mood can be retained.82
His personal views of life, revealed in his last but 
one public paper,83 fully coincide with Epictetus’ at­
titude towards it. They use the same metaphors to ex­
press its playful, nonserious and nonsacred character. 
Epictetus’ refrain that life is a game becomes a leit­
motiv of his. Not only is life a gamç but «the greatest 
game, greater than the pancratium and wrestling and 
all other Olympic games, for its trophy (happiness) is 
the greatest».84 It is a «play» for «boys» with not 
enough winners. As soon as the rules are broken, the 
game is over and the playmates can «depart». Life is 
fun, a great joke, as the Cynics also maintained. And 
in fun there is always escape; for otherwise there 
would be no fun. Life is a guesthouse, a motel, in 
which you lodge for one night, without caring whether 
it is comfortable or boring. Life is a campaign, a 
military service, with everyday issues uncertain. Provi­
sions are not needed when one travels light. Life is an 
excursion with little luggage and many unforseen e- 
vents. It is a banquet which may be interrupted for 
several reasons.85 It is a stage; you need only play well 
the role assigned to you. It is a dance. You can tire of 
it. Life is like attending a fair; there are many distrac­
tions, yet it is worthwhile. Life is a mission. You 
should do your best as far as it goes. And finally life 
is travel,86 without binding commitments, without
79. Op. cit., 6, 74.
80. Ibid., 127, as exercised by Frankl, Man’s Search for Mean­
ing, New York 1963 and Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psy­
chotherapy, 1963, in his «rational therapy».
81. Ibid. 7, 20: «Epictetus’ ethics is largely analysis and 
clarification rather than exhortation to virtue».
82. Ibid., 16fT, 86: «...that life is not cozy...need not be pes­
simism; it could be realism...». Cf. 41: «Eudaemonism and pain- 
oriented ethics are implied in the derivation of the ethics from the 
concept of value».
83. «Freedom and the Tourist Philosopher», Proceedings of the 
XV World Congress of Philosophy, Sofial973, v. 4, pp. 145-47.
84. Dis. Ill 25, 3; I 24, 20. Cf. Epictetus 14, 21, 84, HC 10-14, 
SSTh 86. Yet there is no competitive character in this double 
metaphor «behind which is suicide, no less».
85. Cf. SVF III 768. Most of these metaphors occur in the 
Manual 11, 12, 14, 15 and in Dis., Ill 9, 22, 19, 4-6; 24, 53; IV, 
7, 22-4; II 16, 37; 5, 17; I 24, 20; II 5, 18-21; 14, 24; IV 1, 104- 
9: 4, 24-7; 7, 19; I 12, 21; 25.
86. Dis. 1 4, 18; 22-23; III 21, 9; III 22, 23. Ill 24, 4, where
the words αποδημητικός, έφόδιον etc. occur.
heavy baggage, without deep roots. There is always a 
stop and the «the door is open» if it grows 
wearisome.87
With little textual support Xenakis read into Epic­
tetus his own convictions of the endorsement of 
euthanasia,88 considering it a great benefit for 
mankind. He also felt he shared the sentiment voiced 
by Epicurus that «death is nothing to us». He found 
incorporated into his neo-Stoicism much of the Cynic 
ideal but in a different way than it had been embodied 
by Zeno. They both shared the Cynic simple, 
abstemious and unaffected life and admired the Cynic 
heroes Hercules, Socrates and Diogenes.
Xenakis had in common with Epictetus the same 
«thin» conception of the self, by limiting the seifs 
boundaries to his own doctrines (his προαίρεσις) and 
not making it depend upon the opinions of others. He 
also tried to make his «self» unaffected by strong emo­
tions involving bonds with persons and external things. 
For such commitments constitute a continuous threat 
of the «smooth flow» of life.89 The distinction between 
«me» and «mine» is of extreme importance to both 
philosophers;90 even if «me» amounts in Epictetus to 
«the use of presentations»91 and in Xenakis to the in­
ner core of the self which is «guts freedom». A 
freedom unaccompanied however by its existentialist 
corollaries such as nausea, despair, desertion.92
Xenakis was especially fascinated by Epictetus 
because, as I have said, he was first and foremost a 
teacher, according to his own conception of «teaching» 
philosophy. And it is significant that the temptation of 
the open door allured him when he was on holidays, 
i.e., away from his pupils whose mere presence could 
have dispersed «the smoke from the house» for another 
time.
For all his interest in logic, the part of Epictetus’ 
philosophy which mostly appealed to him was ethics. 
Unlike conventional treatments of Epictetus’ ethical 
theory, such as Bonhöffer’s, with the traditional 
clarification of the Stoic ethical terms, Xenakis 
classified Epictetus’ ethics according to his personal 
conception of his philosophy as a therapy and con­
sidered its negative aspect more important
87. Dis. IV 1, 2; IV 10, 27; I 25, 18; II 1, 20; III 8,6; III 22, 
34; III 24, 105.
88. As in Seneca, De ira I 15, 2. Cf. Dis. II 15, 4-8 and the 
athlete's incident. See Epictetus 17f.
89. Εϋροια βίου, τό εΰρουν (early Stoic terms) are often used by 
Epictetus to denote the unhindered course of life and freedom from 
pain and fear. See Epictetus 89, SSTh, HC and FTPh. Cf. Dis. I 
4, 1-2 and III 2, 9-13. For an Heraclitean diagnosis of the self and 
the mergence of self and freedom see Epictetus 101 and passim.
90. Dis. I 1, 12; 15; M., 9, 2; For Xenakis self=freedom, for 
Epictetus προαίρεσις (which is always free). See FTPh 146, Epic­
tetus 90 f.
91. Dis. I 1, 6; 12; III 27, 67-90; I 20, 16. Xenakis speaks of a 
«noogenic principle».
92. He often speaks of the «existential melodrama» as com­
mitting the noogenic fallacy. For a detailed comparison of the 
Stoic with his own negative sense of freedom and the unwanted 
freedom of Sartre’s existentialism, see FTPh 145-146 and Epictetus 
129ff.
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philosophically (not only historically) and more timely 
in reference to modern needs.
He concentrated upon ethics because he considered 
it to be Epictetus’ «dominant interest» and because he 
had not found «his diagnosis of problems in living and 
techniques for coping with them sufficiently 
appreciated».93 He regarded Epictetus’ ethics as 
«primarily pain oriented» and consisting of «existential 
reminders, such as that things are ephemeral and peo­
ple vulnerable, plus ways of avoiding and easing dis­
tress, including training and thought analysis».94 He 
saw Epictetus more interested in individual than socio­
political ethics and the former more «pain» than 
«happiness-oriented». He divided them into «preven­
tive» (teaching for anticipating ills) and «remedial» 
(techniques for alleviating and rectifying ills). Suicide is 
included among the latter as the most drastic remedy 
when all else failed.95
The degree to which he assimilated Epictetus’ teach­
ing is obvious, if one compares the epilogue of his es­
say «Stoic Suicide Therapy», summarizing the 
presumed Epictetean views, with the last lines of his 
paper read at the Congress. The epilogue of the essay 
can be seen as Epictetus’ last command to Xenakis. It 
runs as follows: «Thus if you get into a crippling car 
smash and no longer enjoy tennis and other things, 
use the extra time and energy on your writing and so 
get more pleasure out of life, because of this concen­
tration and accident—adding perhaps ‘it was meant’ 
(therapeutic preordination). Or split».96
Xenakis seems to have followed the first part of his 
teacher’s command for many years, making a con­
siderable contribution to philosophy with his 
monograph on Epictetus—the only «book-length study 
on him» in English-speaking literature, as he remarks—, 
and many imposant articles published in the best 
philosophical periodi^ls throughout the world. In 
these he tried to testâblish a philosophical terminology 
derived from Greek roots97 which is worthwhile to be 
studied and perhaps used. And there came a time 
when he judged it timely and rational to comply with 
the last part of his teacher’s precept: to see the door 
wide open and make the decisive leap as if ready from 
long ago.
The degree to which he was prepared to depart is 
manifest in his own commandment to himself in the 
epilogue of his paper on «Freedom and the Tourist 
Philosopher». Summing up in it the «tourist outlook on 
life» he gives «a sketch of a possibility, not a 
categorical imperative» which runs as follows: «Live 
and let live. Do your thing. Travel light, live light, for 
sooner or later everything flips (save that). Have only 
weekend relations. Don’t accumulate, improvise in­
stead, so you can flee at a moment’s notice. Be a life
93. Epictetus, Preface p. IX.
94. Ibid., 129-130, 83-85, 27, 7.
95. Ibid., 84-85. Cp. SSth 82-84.
96. SSTh 90 (indication of pages of this essay as in the Greek 
translation, which is not so good and renders proper names badly).
97. See e.g. telic, axic, criteric. theic, somatogenic, noogenic,
'protoconcept, cacodicy, algodicy, etc.
visitor, not a junk collector, a capitalist—unless maybe 
you are another Seneca, the Stoic self-made millionaire 
who had things but was not had by them. The idea be­
ing anyway that what counts in the end is not how 
many things you have, but how much of your heart 
you put into them. How you feel when they are gone. 
Be easy going. Love them and leave them».98
This is the «credo» of a «passerby» of life «like 
crows and ravens». People, according to him, won’t be 
«possessive or possessed by possessions». They should 
«rotate, not be rooted in the soil like plants». This was 
his preparedness: to leave «at a moment’s notice», still 
laughing and before sighing.
Plato said in the Phaedrus (69c): «ναρθηκοφόροι μέν 
πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ παΰροι». I say: «There are many 
historians of Stoicism but very few genuine Stoics».99 
Among the latter, the first and perhaps one of the last 
was J. Xenakis. Not only was he a remarkable scholar 
on Stoicism but a real adherent of the Stoic teaching. 
The Stoic way of life, no less than Stoic philosophy, 
appealed to him greatly. His Stoic death put its stamp 
on a life imbued with the most intimate Stoic beliefs. 
The fact that*he became involved with Stoicism com­
paratively late and after a distinguished career as an 
analytical philosopher helped him to grasp the real 
core of Stoicism and bring it to life. His knowledge of 
Existentialism, on the other hand, enabled him to treat 
Stoicism with an emotional sensitivity and to unders­
tand and better appreciate the Stoic concept of 
freedom from comparison with the Sartrian view of it. 
He said: «In his nonfatalist moods Epictetus allows for 
more freedom than even existentialism does. Absurdi­
ty, anguish, nausea, abandonment, despair, he would 
say, are not necessary».100 The fact that he must have 
discovered Stoicism after a painful personal experience 
made him see in it a harbor and a clinic and ap­
preciate its teaching in a thoroughly different way than 
scholars who, while conscientious, were essentially un­
affected by it. Having taught and written on ethical 
theories, he was able to grasp and show these features 
of Stoic ethics which are philosophically important far 
beyond the age for which they were first formulated, 
features which can render Stoicism a living philosophy 
today.
His Neo-Stoicism is closer to the attitudes of life 
presented in Kazantzakis’ Zorba the Greek and in 
Camus’ The Stranger—in both of whom he sees the 
influence of Epictetus'01—than to the religious and 
humanistic Neo-Stoicism of Justus Lipsius, Descartes,
98. FTPh 147. He does not fail to mention Epictetus and his 
metaphor «be a passerby of life» in this paper.
99. Xenakis had no pity against those «philosophers»—called by 
him «verbosophers» and «phony» philosophers who were not con­
sistent with their teaching. By philosopher he meant purely one 
«who puts to use his valid opinions, who embodies a way of life, 
rather than |one| who can theorize about life». See Epictetus 76.
100. Epictetus 129. But his Stoicism has many existential ele­
ments such as: «self and freedom merge», «I am what I decide to 
be», «act determines character» etc. Yet he does not excuse existen­
tialism for not defending suicide.
101. Ibid., 10, 24: «If Stoic ethics means not resignation but 
nonchalantness».
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Spinoza, Pascal, Kant, the French philosophers of the 
17th century and the English of the 18th, although Xe­
nakis saw the role of Epictetus particularly prominent 
in these movements.'02 His Neo-Stoicism, on the other 
hand, is not orthodox Stoicism, but a peculiar eclec­
ticism of Socraticism and most Socratic and 
Hellenistic currents such as Cynicism, Scepticism, 
Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism. He regarded Stoicism 
as an amalgam of heterogeneous elements.102 03 Thus his 
Neo-Stoicism is a modern world- and life-view 
elaborated with the tools of analytical philosophy, seen 
under the needs of. psychology and psychiatric 
researches, and experienced in an existential mood.
Stoicism, a philosophical system with serious in­
terests in analysis and logic, gave Xenakis not only a 
model of life and death, but also a key to the solution 
of the main philosophical problem of our age. 
Stoicism, and particularly the Stoicism of Epictetus 
taught him that «the split in current philosophy be­
tween analysts and nonanalysts is unnecessary». He 
says: «Certainly it is not clear why a concern with 
language and concepts cannot combine with a concern 
with problems of life and death. Vested interests apart, 
only a narrow definition of philosophy or a superficial 
acquaintance with the powers of conceptual clarifica­
tion prevents the analyst from appreciating what the 
existentialist or Marxist or anarchist is trying to do, or 
vice versa. Indeed, despite both camps, the results of
102. Ibidem. For modern Neo-Stoicism see Long, op. cit., 237- 
241.
103. Ibid., 4, 88. 102.
concept analysis is not just description and informa­
tion, but change in one’s outlook on life and 
language... Analytic and nonanalytic philosophy com­
plement rather than compete with each other, the for­
mer by providing the latter with at least a tool, the lat­
ter by supplying the former with direction. Which 
shows too that they can coexist in the same thinker 
and moment of thought».104
It is a pity that his belief in the vitality of Stoic 
ethics did not make him invulnerable to the irrationali­
ty prevailing in our age and world. For he promised to 
offer much to philosophy by demythologizing it and 
bringing it again close to life. He believed that Stoic 
ethics is «the most binding moral framework the in­
dividual need live by».105 And he claimed: «Epictetus’ 
nonchemico-physical therapeutic techniques will be 
outmoded when (or if) anxiety, dejection, and the rest 
will all be erasable by means of an operation or shock 
treatment or electrical conditioning or a pill, etc... But 
meanwhile, at any rate, apparently his techniques still 
have some use, not to mention the fact that rational 
education, another characteristic feature of his 
thought, will stay with man as long as man is rational; 
for indeed the denial of this is self-contradictory».106
104. Ibid., 130.
105. Ibdid: 126.
106. Ibid., 42: «For Epictetus mental ethics appears to be more 
important than physical medicine». Cf. SSTh. 86: «Even if 
chemicophysical tricks will one day totally eclipse, Cynic-Stoic 
therapy, its underlying philosophy of life and childrearing won’t in 
the process be swept away; for only a cosmic upheaval can do 
that».
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